Unclassified Substitute for Designation 425

The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence published a report on June 20, 2003 analyzing the role of terrorists training camps in Afghanistan in the September 11, 2001 plot to attack the United States. The following information is excerpted from the report:

- 1) Sources suggest that after the plot was set in motion in December 1999, the selection process for members of the "second wave" of hijackers the support team for the pilots also took place in Afghanistan and that it involved direct contact with al-Qa'ida leadership, including Bin Ladin.
- 2) Al-Qa'ida's training facilities in Afghanistan served multiple functions. The Afghan training system:
 - -fostered a jihadist lifestyle among all recruits, allowing al-Qua'ida's leaders to meld men of widely varied backgrounds and nationalities into a focused, singleminded corps.
 - provided the isolation and psychological atmosphere necessary to support classic brainwashing techniques that turned recruits into committed operatives who like several of the 11 September hijackers could be trusted to live for several years in the West and still carry out their mission.
- 3) Travel to Afghanistan was a critical step in turning al-Qua'ida recruits into committed terrorists. The experience of travel to the "pure Islamic state," the camaraderie among recruits, and the discipline and commitment exhibited by al-Qa'ida instructors had a powerful influence on newcomers according to reporting. According to a source, before the mujahadin arrived at the camps, they were curious about jihad but were not committed to it. The time spent in Afghanistan mobilized, radicalized and transformed the youth.
- 4) Advanced training focused on tactical classes, such as explosives handling and detonation, sabotage, and kidnapping. Al-Qa'ida's philosophy was taught along with advanced theological training. Al-Qa'ida also offered this training to recruits from other terrorist groups.
- 5) To prevent backsliding among the second-wave hijackers, the al-Qa'ida trainers in Afghanistan used brain washing techniques to cement their loyalty and discouraged them from contacting their families during their stay in Afghanistan, according to reporting. We know of at least one instance of backsliding by a hijacker candidate, however. An Al-Qa'ida operative who trained in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000 and swore an oath of allegiance to Bin Laden, apparently had second thoughts after he made an unapproved visit to his family. He had been instructed to get a US visa, but he felt misgivings about the suicide mission after speaking with his bother and refused to return to Afghanistan.



UNCLASSIFIED

- 6) Afghanistan offered second-wave hijackers the opportunity to cement their personal ties and loyalties to each other in a relatively secure location as they absorbed the skills needed to execute the plot. Senior planners could observe potential operatives and assemble a team with complimentary skills. Bin Laden suggested that the number of teams in each aircraft comprise individuals who knew each other well and had formed close bonds during training to ensure solidarity to the mission's end, according to reporting.
- 7) Several of the plots key facilitators and members of the Hamburg network also trained in Afghanistan. Like the second-wave hijackers, the visits of the associates and facilitators took place after the Hamburg pilots' travel to Kandahar in late 1999. The Hamburg associates may have made these trips to Afghanistan so that the al-Qa'ida leadership could personally assess their trustworthiness and utility to the unfolding plot.
- 8) Mounir al-Motassedeq, convicted in Germany for his role in supporting the conspiracy, admitted at his trial to having been in Afghanistan from June to August 2000.